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Holleran: Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act

THE PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS AND PRUDENT
PURCHASING ACT OF 1990:
FEDERAL LAW SHIFTS THE DUTY TO WARN
FROM THE PHYSICIAN TO THE PHARMACIST
by
MICHAEL J. HOLLERAN, R.PH. *

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Jones injured his hand while working at a foundry in the city. He was
issued a prescription for a narcotic analgesic by his personal physician, whose
office is near the foundry. Two months prior to this injury, this same physician
prescribed a mild tranquilizer for Mr. Jones which he continues to take several
times a day for the treatment of anxiety. Mr. Jones originally obtained and
continues to legally receive his tranquilizers from a pharmacy near his residence in
the suburbs. Since Mr. Jones was experiencing significant pain after receiving
treatment for his injury, he elected to have his analgesic prescription filled at the
pharmacy located in the same building as his physician's office. The pharmacist
inspected the prescription to determine that it was in fact a valid prescription. The
pharmacist found that the prescription was for an average quantity of a common
but potent analgesic, and that the prescription met all legal requirements for
dispensing the medication. The prescription was properly filled with the
medication requested. Neither the physician nor the pharmacist told Mr. Jones of
the potential for drowsiness associated with the analgesic, nor was he told that
concomitant use of tranquilizers would potentiate this drowsiness. Upon leaving
the pharmacy, Mr. Jones stopped at the drinking fountain near the building's exit
and took one of the analgesics as well as a tranquilizer. He then proceeded to drive
himself home to recuperate. While on the highway, Mr. Jones was overcome by
extreme drowsiness which resulted from the combined effects of the narcotic
analgesic and tranquilizer, and soon crashed into a highway barrier. Is the
physician or pharmacist likely to be held liable for Mr. Jones' accident-related
injuries for failing to warn Mr. Jones of the side effects of the prescribed narcotic
analgesic and the dangers of combining narcotic analgesics and tranquilizers?
A recently enacted amendment' to Title XIX of the Social Security Act is
likely to increase the volume of negligence litigation involving pharmacists and
B.S. Pharmacy, University of Cincinnati; JD., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Fellow, American
Society for Pharmacy Law; Associate, Thompson, Hine and Flory, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 The Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (1991). [hereinafter
Prudent Purchasing Act].
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significantly alter the traditional answer to the question posed. As this article will
discuss, most jurisdictions would be forced to at least reconsider if not entirely
reverse the expected result if this hypothetical case was before a court today. One
of the enumerated purposes of the Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing
Act of 1990 (hereinafter "the Act") is "to enhance the role of pharmacists in
providing quality medical care, through a comprehensive drug utilization review
program. ' 2 However, though the stated purpose is admirable, the Act will likely
statutorily shift the duty to inform patients of the potential consequences of
pharmaceutically-based medical treatment away from the physician and place this
burden upon the pharmacist. 3 As a result of the Act, a pharmacist's statutory
standard of care will be significantly altered. This leads one to ask whether a
pharmacist will be or should be protected by the shorter statute of limitations for
medical malpractice 4 as a pre-emptive move to prevent the cataclysmic increase in
health care costs that will likely follow.
This article will first discuss the legislation recently enacted as part of the
budget reduction package passed by Congress in late 1990 and how that legislation
will affect pharmacists' liability. Second, the article will address the applicable
statutes of limitation regarding pharmacists in particular and within the general area
of malpractice. Third, the applicable standard of care will be explored as it pertains
to pharmacists as well as physicians. Coupled with the standard of care discussion
is an overview of the various theories of liability which physicians and pharmacists
currently face and how these may change under the Act. Finally, this article will
take a closer look at how the Act will specifically affect claims against pharmacists.
PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS AND PRUDENT
PURCHASING ACr OF 1990
The Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 19905 is an Act
that is primarily designed to control the cost of providing Medicaid reimbursement
for prescription medication. 6 However, included within this Act is a provision that
places a statutory standard of care upon the pharmacist. 7 According to the text of
the Act, these additional responsibilities are designed "to enhance the role of
pharmacists in providing quality medical care, through a comprehensive drug
2 136 COWG. REC. S5982-04 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
3 Even if the Bill does not entirely shift the duty to advise patients regarding their medicine, it is likely to
be shared to a much wider extent than under existing law.
4See,e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1992).
5 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (1991).

6 One of the stated purposes is "to provide a mechanism, which states may adopt in their efforts to control
the prices of drugs, to stimulate price competition among manufacturers of drugs which are therapeutic
alternatives . .. " 136 CONG. REC. 5982-04, supra note 2, at (b)(1). A similar measure with virtually
identical provisions relating to pharmacists is also pending before the Senate. See The Medicaid Anti Discriminatory Drug Price and Patient Benefit Restoration Act, 136 CONG. REc. S12954-01 (daily ed. Sept.
12, 1990).
7 Prudent Purchasing Act, U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (1991).
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utilization review program." 8 An additional purpose of the Act is to "control the
price of drugs, [and] to preserve physicians' prerogatives to prescribe as they deem
medically necessary for their patients." 9 The Act provides in pertinent part that:
(I) The pharmacist must offer to discuss with each individual
receiving benefits under this Title or caregiver of such individual (in
person, whenever practicable, or through access to a telephone service
which is toll-free for long distance calls) who presents a prescription,
matters which in the exercise of the pharmacist's professional
judgment (consistent with State law respecting the provision of such
information), the pharmacist deems significant including the
following:
(cc) Special directions and precautions for preparation,
administration and use by the patient.
(dd) Common severe side or adverse effects or interactions and
therapeutic contraindications that may be encountered, including their
avoidance, and the action required if they occur.
(II) A reasonable effort must be made by the pharmacist to obtain,
record, and maintain at least the following information regarding the
individuals receiving benefits under this title:
(bb) Individual history where significant, including disease state
or states, known allergies and drug reactions, and a comprehensive list
of medications and relevant devices. 10
Under the terms of the Act, these duties would only be required when
dealing with a patient whose prescription medication is provided through a state
medicaid program. 1 However, once a higher standard of care is established for
pharmacists dealing with medicaid patients, others will vigorously argue that it
would be inappropriate, unconscionable, and possibly even discriminatory to hold
12
pharmacists to a lower standard of care when dealing with non-medicaid patients.
Therefore, this Act will likely impose its statutory duties upon pharmacists when
dealing with all patients, not just those within the medicaid program.

8Id
10 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(ii) (1991).

1 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (1991).
12 Although this would not be an immediate result, the preferential treatment afforded this class is not
likely to pass constitutional muster particularly since access to health care is involved.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 26:1

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

As it Relates to Pharmacists
Under current law, a pharmacy customer generally has no more than two
years to file an action against a pharmacist for injuries resulting from that
pharmacist's negligence. 13 The applicable statute of limitations is generally the
same as that applied in ordinary negligence cases 14 and not the shortened medical
malpractice one year statute of limitations. 15 For example, in Ohio, a pharmacist
and a pharmacist's function are not expressly included within the definition of a
medical claim or medical malpractice. 16 However, there is some question as to
whether the one year limitation applies. 17 In Reese v. K-Mart Corp.,'8 the Franklin
County Court of Appeals held that a negligence action against a pharmacist for
incorrectly filling a prescription was not barred by the one year statute of
limitations because it was not a "medical claim" as defined by the statute. 19
However, in Boudot v. Schwallie,30 the Hamilton County Court of Appeals held
that the one year statute of limitations was applicable thus barring a claim of
pharmacist's negligence. 21 The court stated that the customer:
comes to the pharmacist, clothed in the doctor-patient relationship,
with a prescription; she asks the defendant, as a pharmacist or
specialist in his field, to fill the prescription; the very basis of her cause
of action is failure on the part of the pharmacist to exercise that degree
of reasonable care employed by those called upon by doctors to fill
prescriptions for the physical impediments of their patients .... The
practice of the profession of pharmacy is a part and parcel of the
system of practice of modem medicine. 2'

13See, e.g., OoIoREv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Baldwin 1992).
Id

14

15See, e.g., OHIoREv.CoDEANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1992) which provides in pertinent part:
(B)(1) Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, an action upon a medical, dental,
optometric, or chiropractic claim shall be commenced within one year after the action
accrued....

Id
16/i
17 The confusion does not arise directly from the language of the statute, but rather in the interpretation as
to who is the "agent" of the physician.
18443 N.E.2d 1391 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
19 "'Medical claim' means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or
hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or against a registered nurse
or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person." OHIO
REV.COOEANN. § 2305.11(DX3) (Baldwin 1992).
20 178 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio CL App. 1961).
21Id
22 Id. at 599-600. "[Tlhe duty to warn of hazards associated with prescription drugs is part and parcel of the
physician-patient relationship .... Ingram v. Hook's Drugs, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ind. CL App. 1985).
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Although Boudot makes a strong argument for the inclusion of the profession of
pharmacy among those professions protected by a one year statute of limitations,
Reese and the majority of decisions hold that a pharmacist's actions fall within the
two year statute of limitations for negligence. It would appear that the latter view is
more likely to be followed in Ohio.
Where pharmacists have been granted privileges or duties traditionally
reserved for physicians, the legislatures have included pharmacists within the
state's malpractice statutes. 23 One such state is Florida, which has granted
pharmacists limited prescribing privileges. 3 The granting of these prescribing
privileges may have prompted the Florida legislature to re-define their "medical
malpractice" statute to include "any provider of health care." Judicial recognition
of pharmacists as "providers of health care" under the statute was seen in Sheils v.
Jack Eckerd Corp.,26 where the court held that an action against a pharmacist who
incorrectly filled a prescription written by a physician was barred by the two year
medical malpractice statute of limitations.
Due to the enactment of the amendment to Title XIX of the Social Security
all pharmacists are likely to stand in a similar position as those pharmacists
in Florida. Although the power to prescribe medications is not granted under the
Act, another of the traditional duties of physicians will be shifted to pharmacists;
namely, the duty to advise patients and to warn of side effects.28 Pharmacists
would then be required to provide "professional services" to patients.
Act ,7

Prior to the enactment of the Act, the physician-patient relationship appeared
to be the factor that traditionally excluded pharmacists from both the liability
associated with failing to inform the patient as well as the need to be included
within the definition of medical malpractice. For example, in Ingram v. Hook's
M This has been seen in California, Florida and Michigan. See CAL CODE OF Civ. P. § 340.5 (West 1982);
FLA. STAT.ANN. § 95.11 (West 1982 and Supp. 1992); MIa. COMP. LAWS ANN. 600.2912 (West 1986).
3* Pharmacists may prescribe certain medications listed in a formulary developed by an appointed
committee. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.186 (West 1982 and Supp. 1992).
The Committee shall establish a formulary of medicinal drugs which may be made
available to the public upon the order of a pharmacist which is issued pursuant to a
dispensing procedure established by the committee for each drug contained in such
formulary. Dispensing procedures may include matters related to reception of patient,
description of his condition, patient interview, patient physician referral, product selection,
and dispensing and use limitations. Id at § 465.186(1).... A pharmacist may order and
dispense a product from the formulary pursuant to the established dispensing procedure, as
adopted by the boards, for each drug in conjunction with its inclusion in the formulary. Id

at § 465.186(2).
An 'action for medical malpractice' is def'med as a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of
the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis,
treatment, or care by any provider of health care." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4Xb) (West 1982 and Supp.
1992).
25

35 560 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1990).
27 Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1980).
2' 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(gX2).
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Drugs, Inc.,29 an Indiana court stated that "the duty to warn of hazards associated
' 30
with prescription drugs is part and parcel of the physician-patient relationship.
This same court went on to say that "[t]he injection of a third-party in the form of a
pharmacist into the physician-patient relationship could undercut the effectiveness
of ongoing treatment." 3 Therefore, it appears that not only is the court not
"including" the pharmacist into the responsible decision making process regarding
patients, but is actually "excluding" the pharmacist from this arena. This exclusion,
whether by design or otherwise, has the apparent effect of insolating the
pharmacist from some degree of liability. 3
In states where pharmacists are not excluded, they are considered to provide
professional services. Michigan has held that "[t]he key to a malpractice claim is
whether it is alleged that the negligence occurred within the course of a
professional relationship." 33 However, similar to the Florida statute previously
discussed, Michigan's malpractice statute of limitations applies to pharmacists as
being included with those who hold themselves out "to be a member of a state
licensed profession."34 It would appear likely that since pharmacists would be
required to provide professional services under the Act, many states may similarly
follow the Michigan and Florida examples and include pharmacists within the
35
malpractice statutes.
For Purposes of "Malpractice"
At common law, "malpractice was restricted to intentional or negligent acts
by physicians and lawyers."36 However, since the origin of the common law,
legislatures have repeatedly broadened the class of persons and occupations
included within the statutory definition of malpractice. The shortened statute of
limitations for medical malpractice apparently grew out of the rapid increase in
malpractice-related litigation and the accompanying increased cost of malpractice
" 476 N.E.2d 881 (Ind.CL App. 1985).
30 d at 886.
31 Id at 887.

2 A review of the cases indicates that the courts repeatedly excuse pharmacists from liability in duty to
warn cases under the banner of physician-patient relationship and the implications associated with this
relationship. See generally Ingram v. Hooks Drugs, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Ramirez -v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Ullman v. Grant, 450 N.Y.S.2d 955 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. 1982); Kinney v. Hutchison, 449 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
33Becker v. Meyer Rexall Drug Co., 367 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
34"A civil action for malpractice may be maintained against any person professing or holding himself out
to be a member of a state licensed profession. The rules of common law applicable to actions against
members of a state licensed profession, for malpractice, are applicable against any person who holds
himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession." MiCH.COMp. LAWS ANN. 600.2912(1) (West
1986).
35 It is not merely the provision of services in general that would trigger this need for statutory protection
or inclusion within the malpractice statues, but rather the specific services called for and lengths to which
the pharmacist must go in attempting to successfully provide these services. See generally Prudent
Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (1991).
36 Reese v. K-Mart Corp., 443 N.E.2d 1391 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
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insurance, both of which drive up the cost of health care. The malpractice statutes
were broadened in an attempt to address the rapid increase in the cost of health
care, which many thought had its genesis in this skyrocketing cost of malpractice
insurance. 37 However, the courts do not appear to be as anxious to include
additional occupations or professions under the umbrella of "malpractice." Many
courts strictly construe the applicable statutes so as to exclude those professions
not expressly mentioned within the plain language of the statute. 38 Therefore, a
statutory change must take place before the judiciary is likely to view pharmacists
as being included within malpractice statutes. The Pharmaceutical Access and
Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990 could easily become the catalyst for such statutory
changes.
PHARMACIST'S CURRENT STANDARD OF CARE

The practice of pharmacy has been commonly defined as the "art of
preparing, compounding, and dispensing of medicines." 39 Former Chief Justice
Warren Burger is credited with having once said that a pharmacist "no more
4
renders a true professional service than does a clerk who sells law books." 0
Others have stated that "[t]he role of the pharmacist, to a great degree, has today
been reduced from the careful compounding of prescribed elixirs to interpretation
of the doctor's handwriting, counting the requisite number of pills, and typing the
directions for use." 41 In contrast however, it has been held that "[tihere can be no
serious question that in performing the service of a pharmacist one engages in a
profession." 42 Regardless of whether these statements reflect the actual
responsibilities of the modem practice of pharmacy, pharmacists are held to an
37 In passing and amending Ohio's malpractice statute, the Ohio General Assembly stated as its goal, "to
stabilize the marketplace for medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic professional liability insurance
in this state, with the concomitant effects of slowing the upward spiral of medical, dental, optometric, and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1989) (legislative
chiropractic care costs in this state.
history).
38 See Reese v. K-Mart Corp., 443 N.E.2d 1391 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
While it is true that pharmacists are professionals in the health care field, they are not
enumerated in R.C. 2305.11(A) and do not fall within the common-law definition of
malpractice. Therefore, the one year statute of limitations set forth in said statute does not
apply to the negligent acts of pharmacists.
ld. at 1392.
39 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDIcAL DICTIONARY 1140 (24th ed. 1965). See also THE A MERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 983 (7th ed. 1978) (similarly defining "pharmacy"). The term
"druggist" is frequently used interchangeably with "pharmacist" and has been defined as "[a] dealer in
drugs; one whose business is to mix, compound, dispense, and sell drugs." B LACK'S LAwDICTIONARY 447
(5th ed. 1979).
40 Brushwood, The Informed Intermediary and the Pharmacist'sDuty to Warn, 4 J. LEGAL M ED. 349, 365
(1983) (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976)). However, what Chief Justice Burger actually said was "[a]ttorneys and physicians are engaged
primarily in providing services in which professional judgement is a large component, a matter very
different from the retail sale of labeled drugs already prepared by others." 425 U.S. at 774.
41 Haunholter, Negligence and the Pharmacist,2 LEGAL MED. Q. 2 (1978).
42 Lee v. Gaddy, 183 So. 4, 5 (Fla. 1938). See also Sashihara v. State Board of Pharmacy, 46 P.2d 804, 805
(Cal. Ct. App. 1935) (specifically holding the practice of pharmacy is a profession).
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elevated standard of care in most jurisdictions."3 For example, in Ohio, a
pharmacist has traditionally been held to an "ordinary care" standard. The Ohio
Supreme Court in Taugher v. Ling defined ordinary care as "that degree of care
in the dispensing of the drugs that persons of ordinary prudence engaged in that
business are accustomed to use under the same or similar circumstances."'4
However, the court further elaborated upon its definition of "ordinary care" as it
pertains to pharmacists. The court stated that such care consists of "the highest
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and the most exact
and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, in
order that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from
the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines." 46 Where a pharmacist
dispenses a medication other than that which was prescribed, there exists a breach
of the duty which accompanies this standard of care. 47 If this breach should be
found the proximate cause of a customer's injury, the pharmacist will be liable for
the proven damages.4 Such "duty, breach, causation, and damages" analysis is the
simple negligence theory of torts.4 However, what are the consequences of a
pharmacist's failure to warn a customer of potential side effects of medications
properly dispensed under a valid physician's prescription?
It appears to have been almost uniformly held that a pharmacist is not liable
for damages arising from prescriptions which are proper on their face and which
have been properly filled. 5° Specifically, it has been held that "[a] pharmacist is not
negligent unless he knowingly dispenses a drug that is inferior or defective."51 This

43 Brushwood, The Informed Intermediaryand the Pharmacist'sDuty to Warn, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 349 (1983).
44 187 N.E. 19 (Ohio 1933) (pharmacist liable for injuries arising from dispensing the wrong medication).
45 d

46 Id See also Kerr v. Clason, 4 Ohio Dec. Reprint 666 (1862).
47 Taugher, 187 N.E. at 21.
48 See generally Boudot v. Schwallie, 178 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). See also Reese v. K-Mart
Corp., 443 N.E.2d 1391 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). "[A] druggist has the duty to compound the drug prescribed,
to use due and proper care in filling the prescription, to use proper methods in the compounding process,
and to ensure that the drug is not adulterated with a foreign substance." Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
49 See generally W. K EETON, PROSSER AND K EETON ON ThE LAW OF TORTS (5th Ed. 1984).
90See Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. CL App. 1987).
51 Ullman v. Grant, 450 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (where pharmacist held not liable for
damages resulting from adverse effects of prescription medication dispensed in the form of a generic
equivalent with physician's permission) The court specifically held that "[a] pharmacist is not negligent
unless he knowingly dispenses a drug that is inferior or defective." Id. at 956. However, it is interesting to
note that this court required that the pharmacist "knowingly" dispense the wrong drug as opposed to
dispensing the drug while exhibiting a level of care that falls short of "that degree of care in the dispensing
of the drugs that persons of ordinary prudence engaged in that business are accustomed to use under the
same or similar circumstances" as required under Taugher, 187 N.E. at 19. Does the element of scienter
required under Ullman v. Grant intend to lower the standard of care?
See also Bichler v. Willing, 397
N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) and see Parker v. State of New York, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1951). But see Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (where the pharmacist could be
held liable for the death of a customer whom the pharmacist knew was an alcoholic for having failed to
warn the decedent of the dangers of drinking alcohol while taking the prescribed medication.)
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lack of liability generally exists even where the pharmacist has failed to warn the
customer of potential side effects of the medication prescribed. ,
It would appear that absent the Act, a pharmacist generally has no duty to
warn customers of potentially adverse side effects, 53 no duty to refuse to fill an
otherwise proper prescription for an addictive drug where the quantity requested is
excessive,54 no duty to identify addicted customers, 55 and, no duty to inform the
prescribing physician of any of these facts. 6- This absence of specific duties has
been upheld, even though many courts recognize that "a pharmacist may have
greater knowledge of drug propensities than a physician."57 This increased
knowledge exists because:
[a]lthough today the pharmacist compounds fewer drugs, he dispenses
more (than ever before), both in kind and quantity, and the demands
that this tremendous number of products place upon him (whether in
the retail or hospital environment) has multiplied the opportunity for
error, and has necessitated the expansion of the pharmacist's
educational training. 3
Both pharmacists and physicians are extensively schooled regarding the
intricacies of prescription medication. However, despite this similarity in training,
it has long been held that "the occupation of a pharmacist and that of a physician
are essentially distinct." - This separation of the two professions is demonstrated
through the fact that although pharmacists are frequently regarded as having
considerably superior expertise regarding the effects and side effects of
medications, 60 pharmacists are not generally considered competent to testify as
expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases against physicians. 6' In contrast,
however, physicians are permitted to testify as experts in negligence actions against

See Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). See also Jones v.
Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. 11. 1985).
IL See also Ullman v. Grant, 450 N.Y.S.2d 955 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1982).
4 Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (III. App. CL 1985).
-5Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct.App. 1988).
56 Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (Il. Ct. App. 1985). However, in Ohio, a pharmacist is
required to "participate with practitioners in reviews of drug utilization." Otio R EV. C ODE ANN. § 4729.02
M

(B) (Baldwin 1990). Participation in reviews of drug utilization is defined as maintaining appropriate
communication with practitioners to relay certain relevant information concerning a patient in an effort to
avoid adverse effects of prescription medication. OHuo AD~miN. CoDn § 4729-5-01(F) (1990).
9 Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). See also Pysz v.
Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
5 Haunholter, Negligence and the Pharmacist, 2 LIEo.M ED. Q. 2 (1978).
5 Greenfield v. Getman, 35 N.E. 435,436 (N.Y. 1893).
0 Haunholter, supra note 45, at 7. See also Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) and see Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
61See Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562 (Ala. 1987) (Pharmacist held incompetent to testify regarding correct
dosage of a prescription medication in a medical malpractice case against a physician).
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pharmacists. 62 This unilateral crossover of competency to testify as an expert
would appear to support the theory that physicians are the parties vested with the
ultimate authority to supervise the medical therapy of the patient and thereby carry
the burden to inform the patient with regard to medications. The conferring of this
authority upon the physician may be the basis for generally having eliminated the
pharmacist's duty to warn patients regarding medications.
In some jurisdictions however, there have been limitations to this absence of
specific duties. In Hand v. Krakowski,63 a New York court held that a pharmacist
had breached his duty of ordinary care when he dispensed a psychotropic drug 6' to
a customer without any warning concerning the dangerous interaction between the
drug and alcohol. The pharmacist's duty to warn arose from the fact that the
pharmacist had specific knowledge that the customer was an alcoholic. 65 Here, the
applied standard of ordinary care was similar to that expressed under Ohio law 6'
and defined as "the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness and
vigilance commensurate with the dangers involved and the consequences which
may attend inattention." 67
Liability for the failure to warn may also arise where the pharmacist has
voluntarily created such a duty by advertising patient counseling as one of the
services performed by the pharmacist. In Laribee v. SuperX Drug,68 an Ohio court
stated that where "a purveyor of prescription drugs advertises that it will give
superior warnings to those to whom they dispense drugs that they have a duty
thereafter to give warning in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the
ordinary layman in the market place." 6 However, it would appear that this court
would find pharmacist liability for failure to warn a patient of adverse side effects
of prescribed medication only where the advertisements expressly create a
heightened duty. The court stated that "nothing in the advertisements in this case
justifie[d] reasonable purchasers to expect from the druggist a 'second medical
opinion."' 70

' See Pressler v. Irvine Drugs, Inc., 215 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. CL App. 1985) (Physician permitted to testify
as an expert where a pharmacist dispensed incorrect type of insulin).
'3 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
64 "Psychotropic" is defined as "Jelxerting an effect upon the mind; capable of modifying mental activity."
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DCTIONARY 1246 (24th ed. 1965).
6 Han4 453 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
65 An Ohio pharmacist is held to "that degree of care in the dispensing of the drugs that persons of ordinary
prudence engaged in that business are accustomed to use under the same or similar circumstances."
Taugher v. Ling, 187 N.E. 19 (Ohio 1933).
67 Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
No. CA-876, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 33026, (Ashland County June 24, 1987).
Id. However, the Laribee court found no liability on the part of the pharmacist or the pharmacy because
the Plaintiff could not establish a reliance upon the advertisements.
M0kd (where the advertisement stated that the pharmacy "would alert their customers to possible dangers
associated with the drugs they sell." ). Id
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A pharmacist's negligence in warning a patient regarding side effects and
drug interactions may also give rise to liability. Recently in Frye v. MedicareGlaser Corp.,7 the Illinois Court of Appeals held a pharmacist liable for failing to
inform the customer that combining the drug with alcohol was dangerous after
having warned that the drug may cause drowsiness. The defendants contended that
a pharmacist "cannot be held liable to [a customer] because the law imposes no
duty upon a pharmacy or its agents to warn customers of the dangers of taking
prescription drugs in combination with other drugs or to warn of the dangerous
side effects of prescription drugs." 72 The court, agreeing with the defendant in part,
held that the pharmacist had "no initial duty to protect the plaintiff, but voluntarily
assumed a duty by placing a warning on the drug. ' 73 The court further held that a
pharmacist is "liable for injuries or death to the consumer if they undertook to
warn the consumer of the dangerous side effects of a prescription drug and did so
negligently." 74
Many jurisdictions appear to hold the prescribing physician responsible for
counseling the patient regarding the medications prescribed. 75 In Jones v. Irvin, 6
the court held that:
[i]t is the duty of the prescribing physician to know the characteristics
of the drug he is prescribing, to know how much of the drug he can
give his patient, to elicit from the patient what other drugs the patient is
taking, to properly prescribe various combinations of drugs, to warn
the patient of any dangers associated with taking the drug, to monitor
the patient's dependence on the drug, and to tell the patient when and
how to take the drug. 17
This proposition has been supported in numerous jurisdictions,78 and is apparently
based upon the concept that counselling the customer regarding his or her
medication "would require a pharmacist to learn the customer's condition and
71 579 N.E.2d 1255 (II. App. CL 1991).
72 d. at 1256.
73 Id at 1259.
74
1&
75 See generally Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist CL App. 1984); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (1l. App. CL 1985). See also Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d
381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Ingram v. Hook's Drugs, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. CL App. 1985); Cobb v.

Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 444 So. 2d 203 (La. Ct. App. 1983). While holding that a pharmacy was. not
liable for injuries allegedly caused by the pharmacist's failure to warn of the effects of using alcohol while
taking certain prescription medication, the Louisiana court noted that at that time (1984), only one other
case could be found which dealt with a pharmacist's duty to warn. See Kinney v. Hutchinson, 449 So. 2d
696, 698 La. Ct. App. 1984).
'6
602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. IlI. 1985).
77
d at 402.
7 See also Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), and see Eldridge v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (HI. App. CL 1985); Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381
(Mich. CL App. 1987); Kinney v. Hutchison, 449 So. 2d 696 (La. CL App. 1984); Makripodis v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. CL 1987).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

I Vol. 26:1I

monitor his drug usage... [thus requiring the pharmacist]... to interject himself
into the doctor-patient relationship and practice medicine without a license." '
Interestingly, this type of conduct on the part of the pharmacist is precisely what
the Act requires. a)
PHYSICIAN'S STANDARD OF CARE
AND THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Negligence
Since the Act apparently shifts the duty to inform patients regarding the
effects of their medication from the physician and places it with the pharmacist, a
review of the traditional standard of care required of physicians regarding
prescription medication may be appropriate. For example, in Ohio, this standard of
care was enunciated in Bruni v. Tatsumi.n Here, the Ohio court held that a
physician is liable for malpractice where:
a preponderance of evidence [establishes] that the injury complained of
was caused by the doing of some particular thing or things that a
physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not
have done under like or similar conditions or circumstances, or by the
failure or omission to do some particular thing or things that such a
physician or surgeon would have done under similar conditions and
circumstances, and that the injury complained of was the direct and
proximate result of such doing or failing to do some one or more of
such particular things.P
Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that a physician who fails to inform his or
her patient of the potential adverse side effects of prescribed medication may be
held liable for resulting injuries arising from such failure to do so if it can be
established that other physicians of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not
have failed to so inform the patient.8
Lack of Informed Consent
Such failure to warn patients of the side effects of prescribed medication
may also be viewed within the scope of malpractice for lack of informed consent.
Depending on in which jurisdiction a claim is filed, this theory of liability requires
9 Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 553 (IIl. App. Ct. 1985).
83 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (1992).
8 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976).
Id. at 675 (syllabus of the court).
U
83 Some jurisdictions have recognized this duty. See Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989).
However, no such cases directly on point with this issue were found in Ohio.
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either that a physician disclose all information that would be material to a
reasonable patient's decision to consent to a treatment, 84 or that the physician
disclose that information which a reasonable physician of ordinary skill, care and
diligence would disclose under the same circumstances. 15 Liability for lack of
informed consent is established when:
(a) The physician fails to disclose to the patient and discuss the
material risks and dangers inherently and potentially involved with
respect to the proposed therapy, if any;
(b) the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been
disclosed by the physician actually materialize and are the proximate
cause of the injury to the patient; and
(c) a reasonable person in the position of the patient would have
decided against the therapy had the material risks and dangers inherent
and incidental to treatment been disclosed to him or her prior to the
8
therapy.
In Harbesonv. Parke-Davis,Inc.,8 7 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
a physician liable for failure to inform a patient of the teratogenic 8 effects of
Dilantin. 9 The court held that a physician must disclose material information
regarding drug therapy for the patient to consider. 90 However, not all jurisdictions
would agree with Harbeson. In Boyer v. Smith, 91 a Pennsylvania court refused to
extend the doctrine of informed consent to apply in situations where the only
treatment was the administration of medication. 9- The court stated that "in light of
the day-to-day realities of providing professional medical care, traditional medical
84 See Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985) where, in reference to informed consent, the

Ohio Supreme Court stated that "[olne of the great dilemmas in applying this test is the question of how
far a doctor must go in establishing whether a potential danger, albeit improbably remote, is sufficiently
material to require disclosure. To this end the reasonable patient standard is utilized." Id at 1148.
85 W. KEETON, supra note 49, at § 32. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
also Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985); Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976).

86 Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 NE.2d 1145, 1148 (Ohio 1985).
'0 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, the patient who planned to become pregnant asked her gynecologist
about the safety in taking her anti-seizure medication while pregnant. No information regarding the drug's
potential for producing birth defects was disclosed, and the patient later gave birth to two children with
birth defects. The unusual fact that the patient had specifically requested the information which was not
disclosed may have been dispositive of this case and may explain why this case is one of very few cases
which hold a physician liable under lack of informed consent regarding the use of prescribed medication.
1 at 522-24.
U8"Teratogenic" means "[tiending to produce anomalies of formation" D ORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1516 (24th ed. 1965). This term may be more fully defined through the description of the drug
as a "teratogen" which is defined as "[a]n agent or factor that causes the production of physical defects in
the developing embryo." Id.
0 Dilantin is the trade name of the drug diphenylhydantoin which is "used as an anticonvulsant in grand
mal epilepsy." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 424 (24th ed. 1965). See also PHYsICIAN's
DESK REFERENcE 1713, 1714 (46th ed. 1992).
9D Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522.

91 497 A.2d 646 (Pa. Super. CL 1985).
- Id at 648.
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malpractice actions, sounding in negligence, are an adequate legal medium for
compensating patients for the injurious consequences of therapeutic drug
treatment." 93
THEORIES OF LIABILITY AS AGAINST PHARMACISTS

Negligence
One of the theories under which pharmacist liability for failure to warn
would arise is negligence. However, for liability to arise under negligence, there
must be a duty as well as evidence of a breach of that duty. 94 Generally, the courts
have held that a pharmacist has no duty to warn patients of the hazards associated
with their prescription medication. 9 In the absence of judicial recognition of the
duty to warn patients of the hazards associated with their prescribed medication, a
litigant may seek statutory support of such duty. 96 However, little sanctuary has
been found within the statutes.
For example, Ohio's statutes defining the "practice of pharmacy" place no
direct duty on the pharmacist to warn patients. 97 At best, an indirect duty to warn is
placed on the Ohio pharmacist by the requirement to participate in "reviews of
drug utilization" expressed within the statutory definition of the practice of
93 Id. The court appeared to indicate that it was rejecting the claim only because it was presented in terms
of "informed consent" and that had the litigants discussed "negligence", these same facts would have
resulted in the physician being held liable.
94 See generally W. KEETON, supra note 49, at § 30 which states:

The traditional formula for the elements necessary to such a cause of action may be stated
briefly as follows:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty.
These two elements go to make up what the courts usually have called negligence; but the
term quite frequently is applied to the second alone. Thus it may be said that the defendant
was negligent, but is not to be liable because he was under no duty to the plaintiff not to

be.
Id
95 See Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. CL App. 1987). See also Jones v.
Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Ullman v. Grant, 450 N.Y.S.2d 955 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
96 However, even the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act appears to recognize that a pharmacist has no

independent duty to warn a patient concerning prescription medication. " Any drug dispensed by filling or
refilling a written or oral prescription of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug shall be
exempt... [from the packaging requirements imposed upon manufacturers] ...

if the drug bears a label

containing the name and address of the dispenser, the serial number and the date of the prescription or of
its filling, the name of the prescriber, and, if stated in the prescription, the name of the patient, and the
directions for use and cautionary statements, if any, contained in such prescription." 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2)
(1988).
97 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4729.02 (Baldwin 1992) which states in pertinent part:

"(B) To "practice pharmacy" means to interpret prescription, to compound or to dispense
drugs, dangerous drugs, and poisons, and related devices that under the federal "Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act" must be labeled for sale only on the order of a practitioner; to
participate in drug selection pursuant to Chapter 3715 and section 4729.38 of the Revised

Code; and to participate with practitioners in reviews of drug utilization"
Id at 4729.02(B).
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pharmacy. Participation in drug utilization reviews requires the pharmacist to
communicate to the physician potential drug interactions, drug allergies, and "other
pertinent information related to the patient for the purpose of avoiding adverse
effects." 99 Conceivably, a litigant could contend that the pharmacist is liable for
damages resulting from the breach of the pharmacist's duty to communicate
"pertinent information related to the patient for the purpose of avoiding adverse
effects" to the physician as required by the statute. 100 This would thereby result in
the inability of the physician to adequately warn the patient.' 0 ' However, despite
this Ohio statute, the courts have repeatedly stated that the ultimate responsibility to
warn the patient remains with the physician. 10 2 Therefore, despite the weak
connection to a potential statutory duty, it would appear unlikely that pharmacist
liability would be found without a more direct statutory or factual establishment of
this duty. However, the Act provides the necessary direct statutory duty that the
courts have yet to encounter.
Strict ProductsLiability
Another theory under which pharmacist liability for failure to warn may
arise is strict products liability as seen in section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. 01 3 Comment K of section 402A states in pertinent part:
9 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.02 (Baldwin 1992).
g9 See OHio ADMIN. CODE § 4729-5-01 (1991) which states in pertinent part:
(F) To participate with practitioners in reviews of drug utilization" means, through
appropriate communication with the practitioner(s) involved, monitoring the use of drugs
to detect possible drug misuse by the patient, abnormal dispensing patterns, duplicated
prescriptions, potential interactions, interferences or incompatibilities by reviewing the
drug regimen and the medication record or drug profile which is based on available drug
history, any known drug allergies or sensitivities, and other pertinent information related to
the patient for the purpose of avoiding adverse effects.
Id
' 0 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4729.02 (Baldwin 1992). See also 0HIO ADMIN. C ODE § 4729-5-01 (1991).
101 If the pharmacist actually knew of specific information that could be critical for the physician to know
in order to avoid an adverse reaction and yet the pharmacist did not convey this information, then, some
courts could view the situation as being analogous to Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982) where the pharmacist was found liable for having failed to warn a known alcoholic of the dangers of
taking the medication while under the influence of alcohol.
102
See generally Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. 11). 1985); Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d
561 (Fla Dist. CL App. 1984); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. CL 1985); Stebbins v.
Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Kinney v. Hutchinson, 449 So. 2d 696 (La. Ct.
App.
1984); Ingrain v. Hook's Drugs, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
10 3
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.
and
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There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
•.. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. (emphasis added) 10
In Palmer v. A. H. Robbins Co. Inc. ,105 the Colorado court held that "a
manufacturer or seller may be strictly liable to users of a product when the failure
to provide adequate warnings [concerning the effects of a medication or device]
renders the product defective and unreasonably dangerous." 1 0 6 However, the
applicability of this general rule to the "practice" of pharmacy is debatable. 107 In
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb,10 8 a California court discussed the dual function of a
pharmacy as both providing a service and selling a product. The court concluded
that although a product is provided to the customer, the essence of the transaction
as between the patient and the pharmacist is providing a service. 109 Therefore, a
pharmacist was held not liable for the failure to warn a patient of the long-term
adverse side effects of a prescribed medication. 10 Another reason behind this
absence of duty is the fact that:
when a consumer asks a druggist to fill a prescription, thus enabling
him to obtain a drug which is not otherwise available to the public, he
does not rely on the druggist's judgement as to whether that particular
drg is inherently fit for its intended purpose but rather he places that
confidence and reliance in the physician who prescribed the remedy. 1"1
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id
104 Id

'05 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
106

1

at 199.

107 Here, "practice" is not intended to be read within the statutory definition of "pharmacy" but rather in a
more practical day-to-day view where one could confuse whether a product is being sold or a service is
being performed. Id
108 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985).
' 1 Id at 252.
110l
'1Ingram v. Hook's Drugs, Inc., 476 N.E.2d 881, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
The rationale... [of those authorities holding a pharmacist under no duty to warn]... is
that the duty to warn of hazards associated with prescription drugs is part and parcel of the
physician-patient relationship because it is best appreciated in this context. . . . The
decision of weighing the benefits of a medication against potential dangers that are
associated with it requires an individualized medical judgment. This individualized
treatment is available in the context of a physician-patient relationship which has the
benefits of medical history and extensive medical examinations. It is not present, however,
in the context of a pharmacist filling a prescription for a retail customer. The injection of a
third-party in the form of a pharmacist into the physician-patient relationship could
undercut the effectiveness of the ongoing medical treatment. We perceive the better rule
to be one which places the duty to warn of the hazards of the drug on the prescribing
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There is also a strong public policy argument against holding pharmacists
strictly liable under a products liability theory. It has been said that "[t]o hold a
druggist strictly liable would be to make the druggist an insurer of the safety of the
manufactured drug."1 1 2 The position of the pharmacist is dissimilar to that of the
pharmaceutical manufacturer. 113 The manufacturer is in the business of selling
products (medications) to physicians and is required to provide adequate warnings
regarding those products to the physician.1"4 In Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.t15 the court explained the rationale behind this general rule
by stating that
[t]he purpose of the requirement that all warnings as to potential
dangers associated with prescription drugs be provided to prescribing
physicians is that the prescribing physicians are, in the case of
prescription drugs, the actual consumers. In most instances, the
patient-consumer would be unable to properly assess and weigh the
benefits and risks attendant to the use of such drugs. 116

physician and requires of the pharmacist only that he include those warnings found in the
prescription.
Id at 886-87.
This extensive discussion regarding the "better rule" that a pharmacist only be required to provide those
warnings contained on the written prescription is in accordance with the position implied in the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act which states in part:
(b)(2) Any drug dispensed by filling or refilling a written or oral prescription of a
practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug shall be exempt . . . from the
packaging requirements . . . [applicable to manufacturers of such drugs] . . . if the drug
bears a label containing the name and address of the dispenser, the serial number and date
of the prescription or of its filling, the name of the prescriber, and, if stated in the
prescription, the name of the patient, and the directionsfor use and cautionary statements,
if any, containedin such prescription.
21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2) (1988)(emphasis added).
112 Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
113 When legally marketing pharmaceuticals, the physician is viewed as the actual consumer. "The
purpose of the requirement that all warnings as to potential dangers associated with prescription drugs be
provided to prescribing physicians is that the prescribing physicians are, in the case of prescription drugs,
the actual consumers." Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super.
CL
1987).
1 14
See Id The court discussed why the warnings are to be directed to the physician and not the patient as
follows;
it is the duty of the prescribing physician to be fully aware of (1) the characteristics of the
drug he is prescribing, (2) the amount of the drug which can be safely administered, and
(3) the different medications the patient is taking. It is also the duty of the prescribing
physician to advise the patient of any dangers or side effects associated with the use of the
drug. The warnings which must accompany such drugs are directed to the physician rather
than to the patient-consumer as "lilt is for the prescribing physician to use his independent
medical judgment, taking into account the data supplied to him from the manufacturer,
other medical literature, and weighing that knowledge against the personal medical history
of his patient, whether to prescribe a given drug.
/d (citing Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 307 A.2d 444, 457 (Pa. Super. CL 1985)).
115523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. CL 1987).
116 ld. at 378.
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The clear distinction between pharmacist liability and that of pharmaceutical
manufacturers appears well established.1 17 However, the Act appears to place the
pharmacist in the position of the consumer of the medications rather than the
physician when discussing the manufacturer's duty to inform.
Some courts have already blurred this distinction. In Bichler v. Willing,118
a New York court held a pharmacist not liable under products liability. The
opinion indicated that the plaintiffs pleadings presented a valid cause of action
under strictproducts liability due to her allegations that the pharmacist "knew or,
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that said drug was
unsafe and unfit for use by reason of the dangerous effects... and that he failed to
warn of these dangers." "19 Obviously, this court was prepared to recognize that a
pharmacist may be held strictly liable under a products liability theory. The Act
would appear to support this conclusion. However, the court found that there was
not sufficient evidence to support the plaintiffs allegations.
IMPACT OF THE "ACT" ON CLAIMS
AGAINST PHARMACISTS

Two key phrases in this Act are likely to trigger a change in the malpractice
statutes of states that do not already include pharmacists. The first is the Act's
statement of purpose, which appears to include pharmacists within that group who
provides "medical care."'120 This phrase would appear to place a pharmacist on the
very edge of Ohio's definition of a "medical claim" as an action arising out of the
"medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person." 121 (emphasis added). The
use of this terminology within the Act would facilitate the inclusion of pharmacists
within various medical malpractice statutes of limitation because the proposed Act
would require that pharmacists become involved in "care."
Second, the Act specifically allows for the "exercise of... [the pharmacist's]
...professional judgment" when deciding which side effects and interactions to
discuss with a patient.' 22 Prior to nurses being included in Ohio's malpractice

11- See generally Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Makripodis v.
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Bichler v. Willing, 397 N.Y.S.2d
57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
118 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
119

1d at 60.

120 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (1991).
121 OituoREv. CoDE ANN. § 2305.11(D)(3) (Baldwin 1992) (emphasis added). However, although the
definition uses the term "care", this is not the controlling term of the definition. Rather, the individuals
enumerated
appear the core of the definition.
122
Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-g(gX2)(A)(ii)(I) (1991). However, no parameters are set up
as to what standard of "professional judgment" shall be followed.
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statute, t23 the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned in Richardson v. Doe 12 4 that since a
nurse was not "required to exercise.., independent judgment on matters which
may mean the difference between life and death

. .

. [that there was] . . . no

compelling reason for a nurse to be given the protection of a one-year statute of
limitations."' 125 The Act has expressly rendered similar reasoning moot with regard
to pharmacists since it would require the exercise of independent judgment. 126
Without this mandatory exercise of independent judgment, a pharmacist's duties
have generally been held to be quite narrow, thereby avoiding the necessity of
modifying statutes of limitation. 12 7 Through the exercise of "professional
judgment," pharmacists will become vulnerable to attack for those judgments
made.
Furthermore, in light of the fact that some jurisdictions have held physicians
liable in malpractice for failing to warn a patient of adverse side effects associated
with prescribed medications 28 even where there was no statutory duty to so
inform the patient, it would appear even more likely that a pharmacist would be
found liable for a similar failure to warn that same patient since the Act provides a
statutory duty to warn. 129 This likelihood is even more certain in view of the fact
that the legislation places an affirmative duty upon the pharmacist to exercise
"professional judgment" in determining which information would be appropriate
to discuss with a patient. 130 Naturally, with the pharmacist's increased statutory
standard of care and mandate to exercise discretion comes increased litigation for
failing to exercise that standard of care or discretion that a pharmacist of ordinary
skill, care and diligence would have exercised under similar circumstances.
123 Currently, "medical claim" is defined as "any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a
physician, podiatrist, or hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or
against a registered nurse or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or
treatment of any person." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.1 l(D)(3) (Baldwin 1992). However, at the time
Richardson v. Doe, 199 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1964) was decided, a "medical claim" was defined as "any
claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis,
care, or treatment of any person." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (D)(3) (Baldwin 1978).
124 199 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1964).
'25 Id at 880.
126 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (1991).
127 "A pharmacist cannot dispense such drugs himself but can do so only upon the direction of a
physician." Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
"[A] druggist has the duty to compound the drug prescribed, to use due and proper care in filling the
prescription, to use proper methods in the compounding process, and to ensure that the drug is not
adulterated with a foreign substance." Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85, 88 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
128 See Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989). See also Robert A. Brazener, Annotation,
Physician's Liabilityfor Injury or Death Resulting From Side Effects of Drugs Intentionally Administered or
Prescribed for a Patient, 45 A.L.R. 3d 928 (1972 and Supp. 1991).
129 This is because the physician has no statutory duty to warn a patient of the side effects of medication
unless that particular jurisdiction views the prescribing of medication as a procedure requiring informed
consent. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Boyer v. Smith, 479 A.2d
646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In contrast, under the proposed Act, the pharmacist would have an affirmative
duty to warn or inform and failure to do so would likely stand as prima facie proof of negligence. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g).
130 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A) (1991).
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The enactment of this amendment to the Social Security Act131 has expressly
shifted any burden to warn to the pharmacist where that pharmacist is compelled to
disclose the precautions and side effects of prescription medication. 132 Each
pharmacist must use his or her discretion as to whether a side effect or precaution
is of such significance that it must be disclosed to the patient. 133 Since the Act is
silent on the standard to which such disclosure will be held, only future litigation
will define which standard (materiality to the reasonable patient,134 or prevailing
standards of pharmaceutical practice 35 ) will be applied with regard to
pharmacists. In jurisdictions which follow the "materiality to the reasonable
patient" standard 136 in informed consent cases, this same standard can be expected
37
to be applied to pharmacists. 1
One of the expressed purposes of the Act is to control the price of
medications that will eventually be paid through medicaid. 38 However, the terms
of the Act are likely to increase the cost of providing that medicine due to the
increased costs of litigation that will be associated with the liability claims of a
pharmacist's failure to warn. A purpose similar to that of the Act was expressed by
the Ohio General Assembly with regard to Ohio's malpractice statute. 139 The
purpose of the recent amendments to the malpractice statute, which broadened the
scope of those included within that statute, was "to stabilize the marketplace for
medical, dental, optometric, and chiropractic professional liability insurance in this
state, with the concomitanteffects of slowing the upward spiralof medical, dental,
optometric, and chiropracticcare costs in this state .... "(emphasis added). 140
This same rationale is the basis of California's cap on recovery of non-economic
damages in malpractice actions. ' 4' Interestingly, the California statute pertaining to
such actions and the cap on recovery refers to "health care providers," which
includes pharmacists. 42 The enactment of the Act will likely create an atmosphere

'3'42 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
132 Prudent Purchasing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (1991).
133 "The pharmacist must offer to discuss with each patient or caregiver who presents a prescription all
matters which in the exercise of his professionaljudgment he deems significant...." Id.(emphasis added).
134 See Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1985).
135 See W. KETON, supra note 49, at § 32. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Bnmi v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976).
136See Nickell v. Gonzalez, 447 N.E.2d 1145 (Ohio 1975).
137 However, the "material to the reasonable person" test for informed consent is applied in Ohio with
respect to medical procedures and not yet with regard to therapeutic medication cases. Considering the
explicit nature of the Act, the courts may hold pharmacists to the more stringent test.
13" 136 CONG. REC. S5982-04, supra note 2.
139
OH1OREv.CoDEANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1989).
140See Ofuo REV.CoDE ANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1989) (legislative history).
141 Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 668 (Cal. 1985).
14 2
CAL.CoDEoF Civ. PROC. § 340.5 (West 1982).
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and Florida 145
where other states will follow the California model.
have done so by including pharmacists within their malpractice statutes.
CONCLUSION

Until the enactment of the Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing
Act of 1990, pharmacists could practice their profession without need for excessive
concern regarding whether he or she fully informed "our" Mr. Jones in this
article's opening scenerio of all the potential side effects of his prescription
medication and all the potential drug interactions. As long as the pharmacist
correctly prepared the medications prescribed by physicians; as long as the
pharmacist was unaware of any peculiar reactions or conditions which would
contraindicate the use of a particular medication in a particular patient; as long as
any warnings placed within the prescription by the physician were communicated
to the patient by the pharmacist, the pharmacist had met his or her obligations. As
a result, pharmacists' liability insurance has been relatively inexpensive. Therefore,
the current cost of providing prescription medication needs to include the cost of
extensive litigation and the accompanying expensive malpractice insurance
premiums that have been seen by physicians in recent years.
The Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990, however,
threatens to dramatically change the practice of pharmacy. Though the Act was
introduced to save money in the medicaid provided health care benefit area, it
would appear that an opposite result will be seen for several reasons. First and
most elementary, filling prescriptions will be more time consuming if the
pharmacist must take a complete medical history of each patient before filling the
prescriptions as required by the Act. The increased time spent per patient will
require more pharmacists per pharmacy and more technical support. This will
naturally lead to increased prescription prices for the general public not covered by
a fixed reimbursement program for prescription medications.
Second and more significantly, along with the increased duties will come
increased litigation and liability. Where a physician has prescribed "our" Mr. Jones
a dangerous combination of medications, and where Mr. Jones or his estate sues
143 Id.
144 MICH. CoNP. LAws AN. § 600.2912 (1986).
A civil action for malpractice may be maintained against any person professing or holding
himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession. The rules of the common law
applicable to actions against members of a state licensed profession, for malpractice, are
applicable against any person who holds himself out to be a member of a state licensed
profession.
It (emphasis added).
145 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (West 1982 and Supp. 1992). "An Action for medical malpractice is defined as
a claim in tort or in contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person
arising out of any medical, dental or surgical diagnosis, treatment, or care by any provider of health care."
(emphasis added) Id
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the physician for failure to warn, it is virtually certain that defense counsel will
introduce the terms of the Act. Defendants may claim either that the Act relieved
the physician of any duty to warn Mr. Jones, or that at the very least, the
pharmacist and the physician should be held jointly and severally liable for the
failure to warn, thereby reducing the extent of recovery attributable to the
physician's acts. The increased litigation and liability of pharmacists will logically
cause a disproportionate increase in the cost of pharmacist's liability insurance if
insurance industry practices hold true to those of the past. Naturally, these
increased costs will be passed on to the consumer, thus resulting in an "upward
spiral" of pharmacy costs in all states. Therefore, it would appear that the only
means of achieving the goals set forth in both the Act and malpractice statutes
would be to include pharmacists within the one year statute of limitations as a preemptive move. Such preventive treatment would be an intelligent step towards cost
containment, rather than waiting for the severe consequences of the Act to be
reflected in prescription prices followed by enactment of legislation as a means of
damage control.
The Act has significantly shifted the duty to warn patients concerning the
side effects of medication to pharmacists. This shift of duty is certain to result in
pharmacists being held liable for the failure to warn under theories of negligence,
lack of informed consent, and possibly strict products liability. However, under
current law in most jurisdictions, the pharmacist is not provided the protection of a
"malpractice" statute of limitations. Unless these statutes are expanded to expressly
include pharmacists, the resulting upward spiral of pharmacist malpractice
insurance will further fuel the inevitable explosion of prescription drug prices due
to the pharmacists' other requirements under the Act. The unfortunate result of not
including pharmacists within ffese statutes will be the total defeat of the'rimary
goal of the Act; namely, to maintain the price of prescription medications at a
reasonably low level.
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